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NOTES

Resolving the Conflict Between the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and the First
Amendment
INTRODUCTION
In May 2010, the New York Times unveiled a series of
misstatements regarding the military career of Connecticut’s
Democratic Senate candidate, Richard Blumenthal.1 As early as
2000, Mr. Blumenthal was believed to be a Vietnam War
veteran.2 Not only did he expressly state, “I served in Vietnam,”
but he also described the anguish he suffered as a result of the
criticism and cynicism he and his “fellow” veterans endured
when they came home.3 Although he made these misstatements
for years, Mr. Blumenthal never served overseas.4 From 1965
through 1970, Mr. Blumenthal reportedly received five draft
deferments; three were educational deferments and two were
occupational.5 Once Mr. Blumenthal exhausted his potential
deferments and drew a very low number in the draft lottery, he
secured a position with the Marine Corps Reserve and avoided
the battlefield.6 Although Mr. Blumenthal took “full
responsibility” for these false claims once they were uncovered,

1

David M. Halbfinger & James Barron, Campaign in Damage Control Over ‘a Few
Misplaced Words,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/19/nyregion/19reax.html?ref=nyregion; Raymond Hernandez, Candidate’s Words on
Vietnam Service Differ from History, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/nyregion/18blumenthal.html.
2
Hernandez, supra note 1, at A1.
3
Id.
4
Id.; Halbfinger & Barron, supra note 1, at A3.
5
Occupational deferments were very rare, especially after President Lyndon
B. Johnson’s administration drastically reduced graduate school deferments in 1968.
Hernandez, supra note 1, at A1.
6
Id.
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he emphasized that he simply “misspoke” and did not
intentionally lie to the American public.7
Shortly thereafter, the Washington Post began
investigating the military history of Illinois Republican Senate
candidate Mark Kirk.8 In his official biography and during a
speech at a House committee hearing in March 2002, Mr. Kirk
claimed that he was once the Navy’s Intelligence Officer of the
Year.9 Aware that the Post investigation would disclose the
inaccuracy of that statement and mindful of the Blumenthal
debacle, Mr. Kirk acted.10 During the week of the media frenzy
surrounding Blumenthal, Mr. Kirk blogged about the
misrepresentation he had made in his biography.11 In actuality,
the National Military Intelligence Association, a professional
organization, gave the award to not just him, but his entire
service unit, which had been based in Aviano, Italy, in 2000.12
Mr. Kirk had also embellished his military career by claiming
that he “served in the Gulf War,” “commanded the Pentagon
war room,” and flew “intelligence missions over Iraq” while
“under fire.”13 Though Mr. Kirk was in fact a member of the
Navy Reserve beginning in 1989, these stories are simply not a
part of his service record.14 Like Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Kirk
came clean in the beginning of June and apologized for his
misstatements.15 Despite lying about their military valor, both
Mr. Blumenthal and Mr. Kirk were elected to the United
States Senate in November 2010.16

7

Halbfinger & Barron, supra note 1, at A3.
R. Jeffrey Smith, Illinois Republican Senator Candidate Admits to Error on Navy
Award, WASH. POST, May 30, 2010, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/29/AR2010052903510.html.
9
Id.
10
Todd Lighty et al., Kirk Apologizes for Misstatements About Military Career, CHI.
TRIB., June 30, 2010, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-06-03/news/ct-metmark-kirk-military-record-060420100603_1_military-gulf-war-democratic-senate.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.; Smith, supra note 8.
15
Lighty, supra note 10. In a meeting with The Chicago Tribune, Kirk
admitted that portions of his résumé regarding his military experience were
embellishments and not as precise as they should be. He apologized for the
“misstatements” and repeatedly indicated that they were “mistakes” due to an effort to
translate technical terms to the voters and the carelessness of his campaign staff. Id.
16
Susan Haigh, Richard Blumenthal Defeats Linda McMahon in Connecticut
Senate Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/02/
richard-blumenthal-defeats-lindamcmahon_n_765868.html?view=screen; Todd Lighty & Bob
Secter, Kirk Captures Senate Seat, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/elections/ct-elect-senate-20101103,0,1866246,full.story.
8
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In addition to public officials, private citizens are lying
about their military valor as well.17 In many instances,
individuals have gone further than Blumenthal or Kirk,
claiming to have received some of the most noteworthy and
honorable military awards, such as the Congressional Medal of
Honor and the Purple Heart.18
In light of a substantial increase in this behavior,19
Congress enacted the Stolen Valor Act of 2005.20 The Act
criminalizes the unauthorized wearing, selling, manufacturing,
and distributing of military awards and decorations, as well as
false representations regarding receipt of the awards made in
written or spoken word.21
Despite this congressional effort, courts have not
consistently upheld the Act under the First Amendment.
Section 704(b) of the Act is particularly problematic; it
criminalizes false representations made “verbally or in
writing.”22 Both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado have
held that section 704(b) is a facially invalid, content-based
17

For example, an individual, Andrew Alexander Diabo, claimed to be “a
wounded Marine helicopter pilot” in Afghanistan and Iraq and a West Point Cadet. He
supported his untruths with a West Point uniform hanging in his closet and military
medals such as a Purple Heart and Silver Star framed and hanging on the walls of his
home. He used these lies about his military history to defraud numerous people,
accumulating over a half million dollars in debt to these individuals. After the Marine
Corps Inspector General’s Office in Washington warned Diabo to stop, Diabo
disappeared before any federal officials could properly charge him with any crimes.
Larry King, How a Local ‘War Hero’ Went AWOL, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 25, 2010, at
A01; see also United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1185 (D. Colo. 2010) (order
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss information) (The defendant, Rick Glen Strandlof,
was charged for falsely claiming to have received a Purple Heart on four separate occasions
and a Silver Star on another occasion.); United States v. McGuinn, No. 07 Cr. 471(KNF), 2007
WL 3050502, at *1-5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007) (memorandum and order) (The defendant, Louis
Lowell McGuinn, after being discharged from the Army as a private, claimed that he was a
lieutenant colonel and actually wore military medals such as the Silver Cross, Purple Heart,
and Silver Star without ever having received the medals for his service. The state charged him
under the Stolen Valor Act.); Christian Davenport, One Man’s Database Helps Uncover Cases
of Falsified Valor, WASH. POST, May 10, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR20100509033.63.html (“The FBI investigated 200 stolen
valor cases . . . and typically receives about 50 tips a month, triple the number that came in
before the September 2001 terrorist attacks.”).
18
See sources cited supra note 17.
19
Davenport, supra note 17.
20
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
21
Id.
22
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 facially invalid under the First Amendment), cert. granted, 80
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); see also Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at
1192 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss information because the Stolen Valor Act
is unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
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restriction under the First Amendment.23 In United States v.
Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit concentrated on the question of
whether “false statements of fact,” targeted by section 704(b),
are protected by the First Amendment.24 The majority held that
false statements are protected and, therefore, cannot be the
predicate of criminal sanction unless the Act passes strict
scrutiny.25 As a result of this conclusion, the court struck down
section 704(b) because less restrictive alternative means were
available to Congress.26 Similarly, in United States v. Strandlof,
the District Court of Colorado found that the Act failed strict
scrutiny.27 According to the court, the government failed to
provide a compelling government interest in support of the Act.28
By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia found section 704(b) constitutional in United
States v. Robbins.29 Directly conflicting with the Ninth Circuit, the
court held that false statements of fact are not protected by the
First Amendment.30 As a result of this finding, the Western
District of Virginia did not apply strict scrutiny, but rather upheld
the Act’s constitutionality under the overbreadth doctrine.31
Overall, the constitutionality of section 704(b) has been
inconsistently rejected among the lower courts.32 In response to
the uncertainty presented by these courts’ decisions, on
October, 17, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in

23

See, e.g., Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217; Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. Under
First Amendment jurisprudence, if the statute at issue is a content-based restriction on
protected speech it is subject to the strict scrutiny test, see, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972), which requires that the government show that
the statute is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). By contrast, if the statute is a content-based restriction on a type
of speech within a traditionally unprotected category, then it is not subject to strict scrutiny,
but rather to less stringent analyses, such as the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness
doctrines. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494-504 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-22 (1972). For a more detailed analysis of the overbreadth and
void-for-vagueness doctrines, see infra Part II.C.
24
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201-17.
25
Id. at 1217.
26
Id. at 1216-17.
27
Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
28
Id. at 1189.
29
759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (W.D. Va. 2011).
30
Id. at 817.
31
Id. at 818-19. See Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.
32
Compare United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210), and Strandlof, 746 F.
Supp. 2d at 1192, with Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
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United States v. Alvarez to determine whether the statute is
facially invalid under the First Amendment.33
Before certiorari was granted, Congress sought to
uphold the initiative of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and
proposed a new statute entitled the Stolen Valor Act of 2011.34
The bill seeks to eliminate subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 704 and
remedy the section’s flaws.35 The bill also expands the reach of
section 704(b) by criminalizing misrepresentations about one’s
“military service,” rather than just misrepresentations about
the receipt of a military award or decoration.36
This note examines section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act
of 2005 and the proposed Stolen Valor Act of 2011 under the
First Amendment. It argues that both Acts are unconstitutional.
Part I recounts the history of protecting military valor in
America leading up to the enactment of the Stolen Valor Act of
2005 and the introduction of the 2011 bill. Part II argues for
section 704(b)’s unconstitutionality under First Amendment
jurisprudence, and Part III discusses the unconstitutionality of
the Stolen Valor Act of 2011. Additionally, this note suggests
further change to the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and calls upon
state and local legislatures, in Part IV, to supplement these
federal remedies. Specifically, Part IV suggests that Congress
should restructure the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 to resemble a
fraud statute. And furthermore, state and local legislatures, to
hold public officials accountable, should impose an eligibility
requirement prohibiting false claims of military valor and
service by individuals seeking an elected position.
I.

PROTECTING MILITARY VALOR AND THE STOLEN VALOR
ACT OF 2005

Valor is defined as the “strength of mind or spirit that
enables a person to encounter danger with firmness.”37 Derived
from Middle English, Anglo-French, and Medieval Latin, valor has
historically become synonymous with strength, worthiness, and

33

United States v. Alvarez, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210).
See Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011); see also
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217 (9th Cir. 2010); Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1192; Robbins,
759 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
35
See H.R. 1775 § 2.
36
Compare id., with Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006).
37
Valor Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/valor (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
34
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bravery.38 Moreover, valor has traditionally been used to
characterize the distinguished bravery of members of the military.39
In an effort to encourage, honor, and recognize military
valor, numerous military awards and decorations have been
created and awarded.40 Honoring members of the military is a
tradition in the United States that dates back to the 1780s, when
George Washington was President.41 As a former general,
President Washington identified with a “desir[e] to cherish [the]
virtuous ambition in his soldiers” exemplified through “instances
of unusual gallantry . . . extraordinary fidelity, and essential
service.”42 In 1782, President Washington created “honorary
badges of distinction” to carry out his objective to “meet [valor]
with [] due reward.”43 Included in these honorary badges was the
predecessor to one of today’s most admirable military awards—
the Purple Heart.44 While introducing these badges and describing
their purposes and importance, Washington also strongly
38

Id.
See, e.g., id. (As an example of the use of the word valor, the site uses, “The
soldiers received the nation’s highest award for valor.”).
40
See, e.g., Medal of Honor, 10 U.S.C. § 3741 (2006) (awarded to a member of
the Army who “distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the
risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty”); Distinguished-Service Cross, id. § 3742
(awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by extraordinary heroism
not justifying the award of a medal of honor”); Distinguished-Service Medal, id. § 3743
(awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by exceptionally
meritorious service to the United States in a duty of great responsibility”); Silver Star, id.
§ 3746 (awarded to a member of the Army who “is cited for gallantry in action that does
not warrant a medal of honor or distinguished-service cross”); Distinguished Flying
Cross, id. § 3749 (awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by
heroism or extraordinary achievement while participating in an aerial flight”); Soldier’s
Medal, id. § 3750 (awarded to a member of the Army who “distinguishes himself by
heroism not involving actual conflict with an enemy”); Civil War Battle Streamers, id.
§ 3753 (authorizes the wearing of these streamers to units and regiments in the Army
entitled by the Secretary of the Army); Korea Defense Service Medal, id. § 3756 (awarded
to qualifying members of the Army who served in the Republic of Korea or adjacent
waters during the conflict in Korea); Purple Heart, id. § 1129 (awarded to a member of
the armed forces “who is killed or wounded in action as the result of an act of an enemy of
the United States”); see also Purple Heart, id. § 1131.
41
GENERAL ORDERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON ISSUED AT NEWBURGH ON THE
HUDSON, 1782-1783, at 30-31 (Edward C. Boynton, ed., Newburgh, N.Y., E.M.
Ruttenber & Son 1883) (Order of Aug. 7, 1782).
42
Id. at 30.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 30-31; see also 10 U.S.C. § 1129 (describing the Purple Heart as an award
given to soldiers who have been “killed or wounded in action as the result of an act of the
enemy of the United States”); Purple Heart, INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY,
http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/purple_heart.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2011)
(describing the background, criteria and components of the Purple Heart). For a list of
United States military ribbons by superiority, see Ribbons—Order of Precedence, INSTITUTE
OF HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/order_of_precedence.aspx (last
visited Sept. 3, 2011).
39
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asserted that individuals who falsely represented themselves as
recipients of the awards should “be severely punished.”45
As the passage of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005
demonstrates, Washington was not the only government official
who sought to protect the reputation of the nation’s military
awards.46 Originally, the Stolen Valor Act only criminalized the
unauthorized wearing, manufacturing, or selling of military
awards and decorations.47 In late 2005, however, Congress
introduced an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 704 that enhanced the
section’s protection.48 The amendment allows the prosecution of
those who falsely claim receipt of military awards.49 The
proposed amendment’s sponsor, former U.S. Congressman John
Salazar, was inspired by the college thesis of a constituent,
Pamela Sterner. In the thesis, Mrs. Sterner advocated for a
criminal statute to police false claims of military valor.50 Upon
45

GENERAL ORDERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 41, at 30-31.
See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Stolen Valor Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 3, 120 Stat. 3266.
47
Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704
(2006) (“Whoever knowingly wears, manufactures, or sells any decoration or medal
authorized by Congress for the armed forces of the United States, or any of the service
medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, or the ribbon, button, or
rosette of any such badge, decoration or medal, or any colorable imitation thereof,
except when authorized under regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”).
48
See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 151 CONG. REC.
S12,684, S12,688 (Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad) (“Recipients of the
Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Awards, Silver Star, or Purple Heart have made
incredible sacrifices for our country. They deserve our thanks and respect. Unfortunately,
however, there are some individuals who diminish the accomplishments of award
recipients by using medals they have not earned. These imposters use fake medals—or
claim to have medals that they have not earned—to gain credibility in their communities.
These fraudulent acts can often lead to the perpetration of very serious crimes. Currently,
Federal law enforcement officials are only able to prosecute those who wear counterfeit
medals. . . . My legislation will allow law enforcement officials to prosecute those who
falsely claim, either verbally or in writing, to be medal recipients.”).
49
See id.
50
See Clay Calvert & Rebekah Rich, Low-Value Expression, Offensive Speech,
and the Qualified First Amendment Right to Lie: From Crush Videos to Fabrications
About Military Medals, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2010) (citing Tom Gottlieb, An Act
for Valor Student’s Legislative Quest Ends with Congressional Approval, ROLL CALL,
Dec. 11, 2006; Pamela M. Sterner, The Stolen Valor Act of 2005: Medal of Honor
Legislative Changes-Title 18 (U.S.C.) (rev. July 13, 2005) (unpublished term paper,
Colorado State University-Pueblo), available at http://www.homeofheroes.com/herobill/
legislation.pdf). Pamela Sterner has worked with her husband Doug, a Vietnam
veteran, to lobby for better recognition of Congressional Medal of Honor recipients and
the exposure of imposters. For example, the Sterners successfully lobbied for the
enactment of legislation authorizing special license plates for recipients. Doug also
created a website, entitled “Home of Heroes” where he posted a database with the
names of over 120,000 actual recipients of military awards. Doug Sterner & Pam
Sterner, Preserving the History of Recipients of the Medal of Honor, HOME OF HEROES,
http://www.homeofheroes.com (last visited June 17, 2011); Davenport, supra note 17.
46
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receipt of Mrs. Sterner’s submission, Mr. Salazar, a Vietnam
veteran, sought to carry out her request.51
This objective was accomplished by enacting 18 U.S.C.
§ 704(b), which states,
Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing,
to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States, any of the
service medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, the
ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or
any colorable imitation of such item shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.52

Additionally, while the original Act only included an
enhanced punishment for unauthorized use of a Congressional
Medal of Honor,53 the amended Act includes enhanced punishment
for misrepresentations regarding a Navy cross, an Air Force cross,
a Silver Star, or a Purple Heart.54 Instead of a fine and/or
incarceration for up to six months, a misdemeanor of this type is
punishable by a fine and/or incarceration for up to one year.55
Within a short time, the bill had 111 cosponsors in the
House of Representatives and twenty-seven cosponsors in the
Senate.56 On December 20, 2006, the amendments were enacted
Currently, military records are not up to par to aid in these investigations so much so
that private individuals, such as Mr. Sterner, have taken it upon themselves to
investigate and unveil these imposters. See id. Congress is, however, attempting to
pass a bill to produce a public online database listing recipients of awards and all
individuals who have served in the armed forces. See Military Valor Roll of Honor Act,
H.R. 666, 111th Cong. § 1136 (2009).
51
See Calvert & Rich, supra note 50, at 16 (citing About John, SALAZAR FOR
CONGRESS, http://www.salazarforcongress.com/about/bio (last visited Jan. 28, 2011)).
52
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006).
53
Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)
(2006) (“If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under subsection (a) is a
Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the punishment provided in that subsection,
the offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.”);
see also id. (defining a “Congressional Medal of Honor” as a medal awarded under 10
U.S.C. § 3741 (1994), 10 U.S.C. § 6241 (1994), or 10 U.S.C. § 8741 (1994)).
54
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(d) (2006) (“If a decoration or
medal involved in an offense described in subsection (a) or (b) is a distinguished-service
cross awarded under section 3742 of title 10, a Navy cross awarded under section 6242
of title 10, an Air Force cross awarded under section 8742 of section 10, a silver star
awarded under section 3746, 6244, or 8746 of title 10, a Purple Heart awarded under
section 1129 of title 10, or any replacement or duplicate medal for such medal as
authorized by law, in lieu of the punishment provided in the applicable subsection, the
offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.”).
55
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 704(a), and § 704(b), with § 704(c), and § 704(d).
56
The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status 109th Congress (20052006) H.R.
3352
Cosponsors,
THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d109:HR03352:@@@P (last visited Sept. 22, 2011); The Library of Congress, Bill
Summary & Status 109th Congress (2005-2006) S. 1998 Cosponsors, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN01998:@@@P (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
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into law and received widespread support.57 In fact, the Senate
unanimously voted in favor of the Act.58
Two states, using the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 as a model,
adopted similar legislation shortly thereafter. Utah adopted the
exact language of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b).59 Similarly, California
enacted a statute criminalizing misrepresentations about one’s
military history if the misrepresentations were made with the
intent to defraud.60 California’s legislature also enacted a separate
provision requiring public officials of the state to resign if they are
convicted under the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005.61
Despite broad support in Congress, some courts have
held the Act unconstitutional. As a result, Congress has
already begun to revise it.62 On May 5, 2011, the House of
Representatives introduced HR 1775, which repeals section
704(b) and creates an entirely new statute entitled the Stolen
Valor Act of 2011.63
57

Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (2006); see also 151
CONG. REC. S9215-9216, S9215 (Sept. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2006_record&page=S9215&position=all
(explicating a unanimous Senate vote for the bill).
58
151 CONG. REC. S9215-9216, S9215 (Sept. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2006_record&page=
S9215&position=all (explicating a unanimous Senate vote for the bill).
59
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-706 (West 2010). Utilizing similar language to
that of the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-9-706 states in part:
(2) Any person who intentionally makes a false representation, verbally or in
writing, that the person has been awarded a service medal is guilty of a class
C misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who wears, purchases, attempts to purchase, solicits for
purchase, mails, ships, imports, exports, produces blank certificates of receipt
for, manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, advertises for sale, trades, barters,
or exchanges for anything of value a service medal, or any colorable imitation
thereof, except when authorized by federal law, or under regulations made
pursuant to federal law, with the intent to defraud, or with the intent to
falsely represent that the person or another person has been awarded a
service medal, is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
60

CAL. PENAL CODE § 532b(c)(1) (West 2011) states, “any person who, orally,
in writing, or by wearing any military decoration, falsely represents himself or herself
to have been awarded any military decoration, with the intent to defraud, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.” While this statute is similar to the federal criminal sanction, the
federal version does not require an intent to defraud. See supra notes 52-54 for the
language of the federal statute. The absence of such language was a problem addressed
by the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210).
61
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 3003 (West 2010) (“An elected officer of the state or a
city, county, city and county, or district in this state forfeits his or her office upon the
conviction of a crime pursuant to the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005 . . . .”).
62
Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
63
Id. §§ 1-2.
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The proposed statute provides,
Whoever, with intent to obtain anything of value, knowingly makes
a misrepresentation regarding his or her military service, shall—(1)
if the misrepresentation is that such individual served in a combat
zone, served in a special operations force, or was awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor, be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both; and (2) in any other case, be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.64

The proposed legislation provides an exception to
prosecution if an individual falsely denies military service.65
Furthermore, the statute creates a defense “if the thing of
value is de minimis”66 and criminalizes not just false
statements about the receipt of military awards but also
misrepresentations about one’s military service in general.67
The bill defines military service as follows:
(A) service in the Armed forces of the United States;
(B) service in a combat zone as a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States;
(C) attainment of a specific rank in the Armed Forces of the United
States; and
(D) receipt of–
(i) any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the
Armed Forces of the United States;
(ii) any of the service medals or badges awarded to members
of such forces; or
(iii) the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge,
decoration, or medal.68

Due to this change in statutory language, the reach of
the proposed legislation differs from section 704(b) of the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005.69 For example, expansion of the crime
as proposed would enable law enforcement to reach individuals
like Blumenthal, who may not have the audacity to claim

64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. § 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Compare id., with Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
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falsely that they received a Congressional Medal of Honor,70 but
who falsely claim to have served, for example, in Vietnam.71
Further, instead of generally criminalizing misrepresentations
regarding the receipt of military awards “verbally or in
writing,” the proposed bill criminalizes conduct with mens rea
components of knowledge and “intent to obtain anything of
value.”72 The absence of a mens rea element in the Stolen Valor
Act of 2005 was one of the main concerns of the courts that
found it facially invalid under the First Amendment.73
Interestingly, the 2011 bill does not provide a harm element
either, which the Ninth Circuit and District of Colorado both
suggested would be necessary for the Act to be constitutional.74
II.

APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO
THE STOLEN VALOR ACT OF 2005

The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 has been analyzed under a
variety of tests pursuant to First Amendment case law, which has
contributed to inconsistent decisions as to the constitutionality of
the Act.75 In anticipation of the Supreme Court’s review of the
Act’s constitutionality,76 this section first demonstrates that the
Act regulates protected speech based on its content. Then, this
section explicates each of the applicable tests under the First
Amendment and applies them to section 704(b). Ultimately, the
Act is unconstitutional because it runs afoul of each of these tests
and the Supreme Court should strike it down.

70

Xavier Alvarez claimed that he had received the Congressional Medal of
Honor. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210).
71
Senate candidate Richard Blumenthal claims he misspoke about serving in
Vietnam as opposed to in the Military Reserves. Hernandez, supra note 1, at A1. Any
service in the military is noteworthy. But when a person claims he served in one (usually
higher-ranking) capacity when he actually served in another, it is difficult to fathom that
such a misrepresentation would be made unknowingly or unintentionally—unless the
serviceman truly “misspoke” and later corrected himself. As a note, courts should not
determine which service outweighs another; rather, courts should use the system the
military has already established. For the Institute of Heraldry’s order of precedence for
military ribbons, see INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, supra note 44.
72
Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
73
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1212; United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d
1183, 1188 (D. Colo. 2010) (order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss information).
74
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216; Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
75
Compare Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217, and Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at
1187-92, with United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (W.D. Va. 2011) .
76
United States v. Alvarez, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210).
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The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 & False Statements of Fact:
An Unconstitutional Restriction on Protected Speech

A constitutional analysis of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005
must begin with a threshold determination of whether the
First Amendment protects the speech the Act seeks to regulate.
In United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a
list of categories of speech that the First Amendment does not
protect: “obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech
integral to criminal conduct.”77 Even though the Court
acknowledged that this list is not exhaustive,78 the Court is
generally reluctant to create a new category because it does not
want to broaden the reach of the government over public
discourse.79 Thus, in determining whether the speech at issue in
a government regulation should be afforded an exception to
First Amendment protection, the Court first tries to fit the
speech into one of the existing categories.80 If there is no
recognized classification, then the Court requires the
government to proffer evidence that the speech has not
traditionally been protected by the First Amendment—and
therefore should not be protected today.81
The Stolen Valor Act concerns “false statement[s] of fact,”
or lies.82 Surely “there is no unbridled constitutional right to lie.”83
But mere lies do not fall under the list of traditionally unprotected
categories,84 nor are they worthy of a newly recognized one.
Therefore, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 regulates protected speech
and is not presumptively constitutional under this analysis.
1. Failing to Fit Within Unprotected Categories of
Speech
False statements of fact are most closely related to
defamation and fraud, but are insufficiently identifiable with
either to constitute unprotected speech.85
77

United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1586.
79
See id. at 1585.
80
See id. at 1584.
81
See id. at 1585.
82
See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006); United States v.
Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the type of speech at issue as a
“false statement of fact”), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210).
83
Id. at 1205.
84
See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585-86.
85
See id. at 1584 (listing unprotected categories). The Act’s false statements
of fact would not fall under Stevens’ remaining three categories. To be obscene, the
78
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Defamatory speech must inflict harm to another’s
reputation.86 If the statements concern a “matter of public concern”
or a public official,87 the plaintiff must show that the statements
were made with “actual malice.”88 Even though false statements
can be defamatory, the Stolen Valor Act does not require that false
statements be made with a specific intent or a resulting harm.89
Additionally, despite the Act’s regulation of speech that would, in
effect, “defame” the military, the speech does not constitute
defamation because the military is a government agency, not an
individual. Therefore, false statements of fact under the Act do not
fall within the category of defamation.
The fraud category is equally inapplicable. The
prosecution in a case of fraud must prove a bona fide harm;
fraudulent statements or conduct must “induce another to act
to his or her detriment.”90 As indicated, prosecution under the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 requires no evidence of harm.
Even when comparing the Act to other types of fraud
statutes, it still does not fit neatly. For example, 18 U.S.C.
§ 912, which criminalizes the impersonation of government
employees or officers,91 attaches when the individual
“perform[s] . . . acts under the guise of [the] assumed identity”92

speech would have to do with sexuality or sexual desire. Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973) (In determining whether a work is obscene, “the trier of fact must [ask]
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”) To constitute incitement, the
speech would have to “persuad[e] another person to commit a crime.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 347 (3d pocket ed. 2006). To amount to speech integral to criminal
conduct, the speech must be “intrinsically related” to a crime. See New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982).
86
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
87
Id.
88
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
89
See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). While it can be
argued that injury to the public may be implied if the speaker is a public official, the
Stolen Valor Act does not specifically address public officials. For a more detailed analysis
of the harms resulting from false statements made by public officials, see infra Part IV.B.
90
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
91
18 U.S.C. § 912 (“Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or
employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or
officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains
any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”).
92
United States v. Harmon, 496 F.2d 20, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1974) (the court
dismissed an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1970), using the same “and acts as
such” language as the current version 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2006), because it did not allege
that defendant performed any “acts”).
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in an effort to obtain a benefit to which he is not entitled.93 The
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 does not require any specific acts in
furtherance of any motive; it requires the mere utterance of
words. Additionally, the Act is not comparable to perjury,
requiring a “willful” false statement made under oath, or even
criminally fraudulent administrative filings, requiring: (1)
scienter and (2) the objective to interfere with the proper
functioning, or the economic interests, of the government or a
private party.94
Without these extra elements, the false statements of fact
criminalized under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 fail to fall within
any of the categories of unprotected speech articulated in Stevens.
2. False Statements of Fact—Their Own Category?
Even though “false statements” under section 704(b) do
not fall within any of the currently unprotected categories of
speech, the Court could recognize false statements of fact as a
new category.95 But when analyzed in terms of history and
tradition, false statements of fact do not fall within the type of
speech that has traditionally remained unprotected by the
First Amendment and therefore do not constitute their own
category of unprotected speech.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
noted its tolerance of some “erroneous statement[s].”96
Protection of some false speech is required to preserve the
“breathing space that [freedoms of expression] need to survive.”97
In other words, as the Ninth Circuit articulated, “the First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to
protect speech that matters.”98 Therefore, a category of
unprotected speech for all false statements should not be created.
Despite this seemingly supported rationale, the Western
District of Virginia, in United States v. Robbins, relied upon
93

18 U.S.C. § 912.
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993) (involving a prosecution for perjury
under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No.
11-210); and 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (an example of a federal statute criminalizing falsities
when trying to obtain health care benefits)).
95
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
96
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (stating that
“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963))).
97
Id.
98
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 341 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. to support its conclusion that false
statements of fact constitute their own category of unprotected
speech.99 The Court in Gertz described false statements of fact
as “belong[ing] to that category of utterances . . . of such slight
social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”100 However, more recently in Stevens, the Court
seemed to reject the approach utilized in Gertz, stating that
“[t]he First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”101 According to
the Supreme Court, the language articulated in Gertz was not a
test to be applied to speech when determining whether it is an
exception to First Amendment protection; rather, it was
dictum.102 Even if the “speech is not very important” or lacks
societal value, the Court seems to say that it cannot be
influenced by these factors when determining whether
government regulation has stepped too far.103
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, in Alvarez, explained that
while some categorical exclusions do comprise false-statement
speech, the falsity of speech alone is not enough to take it
beyond the scope of First Amendment protection.104 Despite
relying on Supreme Court precedent, Judge Bybee, in his
dissent, did not appear to fully refute the majority’s assertion.105
For example, when arguing that false statements of fact fall
outside of First Amendment protection, Judge Bybee partially
relied upon Garrison v. Louisiana, which states that “knowingly
false statement[s] . . . do not enjoy constitutional protection.”106
Yet the false statement in Garrison was defamatory and
therefore had to be made with “actual malice.”107

99

United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 817-18 (W.D. Va. 2011)
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40).
100
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)).
101
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
102
Id. at 1585-86.
103
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000).
104
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210).
105
Id. at 1219 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 75 (1964)).
106
Id.
107
Compare Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75, with Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1219 (Bybee,
J., dissenting).
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Overall, false statements of fact, without more, have
historically been protected by the First Amendment and should
not be classified as their own category of unprotected speech.
B.

The Stolen Valor Act of 2005—An Unconstitutional
Content-Based Restriction

Since the Stolen Valor Act regulates protected speech,
the Act is subject to further constitutional analysis.108 In addition
to the distinction between protected and unprotected speech, the
Supreme Court has differentiated between content-neutral and
content-based regulations.109 If the regulation is content-based,
then the regulation is presumptively invalid; the government
may rebut this presumption by showing that the law passes
strict scrutiny,110 “the most demanding test known to
constitutional law.”111 Under this standard, the Stolen Valor Act
of 2005 is unconstitutional because it sets forth a content-based
restriction in section 704(b) and fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.
1. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Restrictions
on Speech
Content-based restrictions prohibit or inhibit a type of
speech based solely on its topic, whereas content-neutral
restrictions regulate speech in general, regardless of its subject
matter.112 The Supreme Court has confirmed this distinction in
a number of cases. In United States v. Stevens, the Supreme
Court found a statute that prohibited “visual and audio
depictions” in which “a living animal [was] intentionally harmed”
to be content-based.113 In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
the Court also found the City’s regulation content-based where
the statute prohibited all peaceful picketing next to schools except
if the picketing related to a “school’s labor-management
108

Compare Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217, and United States v. Strandlof, 746 F.
Supp. 2d 1183, 1187-92 (D. Colo. 2010), with United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d
815, 821 (W.D. Va. 2011).
109
See, e.g., Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970); see also Geoffrey
R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth
Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 278 (2009). See generally Christopher M. Schultz, Note,
Content-Based Restrictions on Free Expression: Reevaluating the High Versus Low
Value Speech Distinction, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 573 (1999).
110
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
111
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
112
See, e.g., Police Dep’t. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Schact, 398
U.S. at 63; see also Stone, supra note 109, at 278.
113
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
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dispute.”114 The Court in Mosley noted, however, that had the city
ordinance prohibited all peaceful picketing without exception, the
statute would have been content-neutral.115
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 prohibits false statements
of fact only when the statements misrepresent the individual’s
receipt of a military award.116 Similar to the statutes at issue in
Stevens and Mosley, the Act requires the government to look at
the content of the expression to determine whether the speech
is prohibited. Therefore, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 is a
content-based restriction on speech.
2. Applying Strict Scrutiny
As a content-based restriction on protected speech, the
Act is subject to strict scrutiny. To pass constitutional muster
under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the
statute at issue “serve[s] a compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”117 Ultimately, the Stolen
Valor Act of 2005 fails to satisfy either element of this test.
a. Government Interest
In order to pass strict scrutiny, the government first
bears the burden of showing that the statute is supported by a
“compelling government interest.”118 A compelling government
interest is one “of the highest order”119 and very few government
interests are able to meet this standard.120 If there is no
“compelling government interest” for the Stolen Valor Act of
2005, the Act will not pass constitutional muster.121 Even
though the government may conceivably present a few
purposes that support the Act, none is compelling.
The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the “sacrifice,
history, reputation, honor and meaning associated with military
114

Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
See id.
116
See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006).
117
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1982)).
118
Id.
119
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
120
See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S.
115, 130 (1989) (holding the protection of the physical and psychological well-being of
minors is a compelling government interest supporting the regulation of obscene
telephone calls); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (holding national security as a
compelling government interest).
121
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
115
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medals and decorations.”122 The Act is also meant to incentivize
acts of meritorious bravery.123 In other words, if anyone can claim
that he or she has a military award, the incentive value of the
award diminishes.124 While the Ninth Circuit and the District of
Colorado recognized that these are important government
interests,125 they are not compelling. Due to congressional
authority to “raise and support armies,” courts generally give
more deference to regulations with military purposes, especially
when those purposes are “unrelated to the suppression of
speech.”126 However, as the District of Colorado noted, there is no
precedent that the Act’s interests are compelling.127
National security is the closest recognized compelling
interest because incentivizing acts of valor and maintaining the
reputation of the military strengthens the nation’s defense.128
Nevertheless, the absence of the Act’s protection would not
create disarray or malfunction great enough to threaten
national security. The Act simply seeks to protect a rewards
system, albeit a very important and honorable system, but not
something that upholds the security of the nation.129
Additionally, precedent suggests that the putative interests
behind the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 are not compelling. In
Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court struck down a statute
that criminalized flag burning because the interest put forward
by the government, “preserving the flag as a symbol of national
unity,” was insufficiently compelling.130 According to the
Supreme Court, “To conclude that the government may permit
designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited

122

United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1189 (D. Colo. 2010).
Id. at 1190.
124
Id.
125
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); see Strandlof, 746 F. Supp.
2d at 1189-91.
126
See United States v. Perelman, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1238 (D. Nev. 2010)
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); Log Cabin Republicans v.
United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 926-27 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
127
Order for Supplemental Briefing, United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp.
2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010) (No. 09-cr-00497-REB), 2009 WL 5126540, at *2.
128
See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (holding national security as a
compelling government interest).
129
For a description of the United States’ awards system and a description of the
evolution of heraldry, see Ribbons—Order of Precedence, INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY,
http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/order_of_precedence.aspx (last visited Sept. 3,
2011); What Is Heraldry, INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/
Heraldry /heraldry.aspx.
130
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989).
123
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set of messages would be to enter a territory having no
discernible or defensible boundaries.”131
Furthermore, the judiciary treats the secondary interest
regarding incentives with equal, if not more, disfavor. Both the
District of Colorado and the Ninth Circuit were skeptical that a
soldier’s act of valor is solely motivated by a medal.132 After all,
soldiers performed acts of bravery well before the existence of
military awards.133 By arguing that military decorations
incentivize valor, the government in fact diminishes the value
of the valorous acts it claims to protect.134
Though not all courts have addressed whether the
government’s interests in issuing awards of commendation are
compelling, not a single court has held that they are. While the
Ninth Circuit avoided a clear holding on this issue, the District
Court of Colorado clearly indicated that the government
interests are not compelling.135 In conclusion, the Stolen Valor
Act of 2005 does not serve any “compelling government
interest” and therefore fails the first prong of strict scrutiny.
b. Narrow Tailoring
Even if a court finds an asserted government interest
compelling, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 would still fail strict
scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored.136 In order to meet
this standard, the Act must utilize the “least restrictive means”
to further the government interest.137 The Stolen Valor Act of
2005 fails to meet this standard due to the vast number of
alternative, less restrictive measures the government could
have implemented in lieu of the Act.
For example, in Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
if the Act were restructured to include elements of mens rea and
injury, it may pass constitutional muster.138 In fact, if the Act were
amended to attach only when another individual’s reliance on
falsities were to his or her detriment, the Act would more closely
resemble a fraud statute (a category of unprotected speech).139
131

Id. at 417.
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91.
133
GENERAL ORDERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 41, at 30-31.
134
Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91.
135
Id.; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216.
136
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
137
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 130 (1989).
138
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1209-11.
139
See supra Part II.A.1.
132
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Aside from amending the Act, the court also suggested
that there may be no need for a criminal statute at all.140 As
declared by the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson, “If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to overt the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”141
Since the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 punishes the statements
solely because they are false, more speech that unveils the
falsehood could be sufficient to deter the lies. In turn, law
enforcement would not need to waste its time prosecuting.
The Ninth Circuit also suggested that the following
were less restrictive means to achieve the government’s goals:
“publicizing the names of legitimate recipients or false
claimants, creating an educational program, [or] prohibiting
the act of posing as a veteran to obtain certain benefits.”142
Altogether, the government could have used less
restrictive means that would not have burdened individuals’
First Amendment rights. Although not all courts have analyzed
the tailoring of the Act, the Ninth Circuit’s suggestions appear
reasonably valid.143 Overall, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 fails
both prongs of strict scrutiny and is therefore unconstitutional.
C.

The Stolen Valor Act of 2005—Unconstitutionally
Overbroad and Void-for-Vagueness

Even though the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 should be
struck down as a content-based restriction of constitutionally
protected speech, the Act may also fail scrutiny under the
overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines.144 Under both of
these doctrines, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 is unconstitutional.
1. Overbreadth Doctrine
The First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine may be
used to facially challenge a statute if the statute is either a
content-neutral or a content-based restriction on protected
speech or if it regulates unprotected speech.145 According to the
140

Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
142
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1210.
143
Id. at 1217.
144
See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 494-504 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-22 (1972).
145
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
141
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Supreme Court, “the party challenging the law must
demonstrate not just from the text of the statute, but also from
actual fact that a substantial number of instances exist in
which the law cannot be applied constitutionally.”146 If the facial
challenge is successful, “the prosecution fails regardless of the
nature of the defendant’s own conduct, because [it] renders a
statute unconstitutional and invalid in all its applications.”147
Because an overbreadth challenge will render an entire statute
invalid even if the statute has no unconstitutional effect as
applied, the Court is generally reluctant to strike down
legislation under this doctrine.148 Despite this reluctance, the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 may be struck down as facially
overbroad.
As recognized by the dissent in Alvarez, penned by
Judge Bybee, there are at least two ways section 704(b) may be
overbroad.149 First, Judge Bybee conceded that the Act may
reach “inadvertent violations of the act” due to the lack of a
scienter requirement.150 Second, the Act gives no exception for
“satire or imaginative expression,” both historically protected
speech.151 Whether these mistaken and theatrical statements
are substantial enough to create a realistic threat is a difficult
question to answer.152 However, it appears that the Act under
these circumstances would cut into private conversations and
chill speech historically protected by the First Amendment.153
To determine whether either of these examples of
overreaching is sufficient to support an overbreadth challenge,
the first step is to ask “whether the Stolen Valor Act actually
covers” mistaken or theatrical statements.154 When interpreting
statutes under this doctrine, courts do “not lightly assume that
Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected
liberties” and therefore look for a “limiting construction” that
146

N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1236 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Wurtz v. Risley,
719 F.2d 1438, 1440 (9th Cir. 1983); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 483 (1989)).
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United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
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Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1236 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
150
Id. at 1236-37.
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See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).
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See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52, 57 (1988) (holding that
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could avoid overbreadth.155 Judge Bybee, in his Alvarez dissent,
and Judge Jones, in United States v. Robbins, used two
different approaches to limit the Stolen Valor Act’s
construction.156 Neither of the constructions seems sufficient to
overcome an overbreadth challenge.
In Robbins, Judge Jones of the Western District of
Virginia asserted that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 should be
read to only address “knowingly false statements” where “the
defendant intended to deceive.”157 Judge Jones concluded that
this limiting construction would not suppress ambiguous,
mistaken, or misunderstood statements, nor punish “false
statement in fictions, in parody, or as rhetorical hyperbole;”
“only outright lies, not ideas, [would be] punishable.”158
While this approach does limit the Act to avoid
overbreadth, the construction also seems to be impermissible.
Perhaps interpreting the statute to include a “knowing”
element would be permissible, but assuming an “intent to
deceive” does not seem appropriate when no actual words in
the statute support that notion. In support of the specific
intent, Judge Jones cited two cases.159 Each case involved facial
challenges against a statute criminalizing false representations
of United States citizenship.160 In the first case, the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Esparza-Ponce considered statutory
language “mak[ing] it a crime for anyone to knowingly and
falsely represent himself to be a citizen of the United States
without regard” to whom the statement was made. The statute
should be read, the Court held, to require proof that “the
person to whom [the] false statement was made had good
reason to inquire into the nationality status.”161 In the second
case, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Achtner that
“representation of citizenship must still be made to a person
having some right to inquire or adequate reason for
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United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818 (W.D. Va. 2011)
(quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568 (1988)).
156
Compare Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1237-41 (Bybee, J., dissenting), with
Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 818-19.
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ascertaining a defendant’s citizenship.”162 In both of these cases,
the courts pointed out that the limiting construction they
applied to the statute already existed prior to the facial
challenges brought before them.163 Using the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Reno v. ACLU, the Ninth Circuit noted that even
though courts may impose limiting constructions if there is not
one already in place, to impose a new one, the statute must be
“readily susceptible to th[e] construction.”164
No court had implemented a limiting construction of the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 prior to Judge Jones’s attempt in
Robbins.165 Further, section 704(b) does not appear to be
“readily susceptible” to the limiting construction Judge Jones
sought to employ. To begin with, neither of the cases Judge
Jones cited limits the construction of the statute to include a
specific intent of the perpetrator.166 Additionally, no words or
phrases in the statute imply that Congress meant to require
the specific intent to deceive.167
In ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, the Northern District of
Georgia rejected the government’s suggestion to engraft onto a
statute the specific intent to deceive or defraud.168 The statute
made it a crime for
any person . . . knowingly to transmit any data through a computer
network . . . for the purpose of setting up, maintaining, operating, or
exchanging data with an electronic mailbox, home page, or any other
electronic information storage bank or point of access to electronic
information if such data uses any individual name . . . to falsely
identify the person . . . .169

The district court noted that “[b]y its plain language the
criminal prohibition applies regardless of whether a speaker has
any intent to deceive or whether deception actually occurs.”170
Additionally, the phrases intent to deceive and intent to defraud
appear nowhere in the language of the statute, despite the
“express[] inclu[sion] [of such phrases] in other Georgia criminal
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statutes which require proof of specific intent.”171 Moreover, the
district court asserted that although the word falsely does
appear in the statute, it is not synonymous with intent to deceive
or intent to defraud.172 “‘Falsely’ means merely ‘wrongly,’
‘incorrectly,’ or ‘not truthfully.’”173
Here, the plain language of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005
applies “regardless of whether a speaker has any intent to
deceive.”174 The Act omits the phrases intent to deceive and intent
to defraud—phrases that Congress expressly uses in other
federal criminal statutes.175 Furthermore, while the Act uses the
word falsely, the Act cannot be construed to require a specific
intent based on the use of this word because falsely is by no
means synonymous with an intent to deceive.176 Thus, the Stolen
Valor Act of 2005 does not appear to be “readily susceptible” to
Judge Jones’s limiting construction requiring a specific intent.
In Alvarez, Judge Bybee applied a different limiting
construction. But the construction is still insufficient to satisfy
the overbreadth doctrine. Judge Bybee based his limiting
construction upon the interpretation of the word represents in
the Act, calling upon Webster’s Dictionary’s “first definition of
the word . . . ‘[t]o bring clearly before the mind: [to] cause to be
known . . . [to] present esp. by description.’”177 With this
definition in mind, Judge Bybee asserted that “an ambiguous
statement that could conceivably be misinterpreted to claim
receipt of a military award could not be punished under the Act
because such a statement would not ‘bring clearly before the
mind’ of the listener that the speaker has described himself as
having won the award.”178 He also argued that the Act would
not apply under his construction to “satirical or theatrical
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Id. at 1232 n.4.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 1232.
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statements claiming receipt of a military award” because any
such statements would be “entirely untrue.”179
Concededly, Judge Bybee’s limiting construction is
compelling; it could easily be implemented to restrict the reach
of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. However, Judge Bybee seemed
to focus on a very narrow portion of the meaning of represent
and creates a misimpression as to how effective this limiting
construction would be. For example, Webster’s Dictionary also
indicates that represent is defined as “to serve as a sign or
symbol of,” “to portray or exhibit in art,” “to serve as the
counterpart image of,” “to produce on the stage,” “to act the
part or role of,” and “to describe as having a specified character
or quality.”180 Additionally, while Webster’s Dictionary’s first
definition is “to bring clearly before the mind,” Oxford
Dictionaries lists first, to “be entitled or appointed to act or
speak for (someone), especially in an official capacity.”181 That
first definition is followed by “constitute; amount to” and “depict
(a particular subject) in a picture or other work of art.”182 In the
legal context, the Federal Circuit has found the definition of
represent to include, “to be an accredited deputy or substitute for
(a number of persons) in a legislative or deliberative assembly,”
“to describe as having a specified character or quality; to give out
assert or declare to be of a certain kind,” and “to symbolize, to
serve as a visible or concrete embodiment.”183 With this fuller
understanding of the meaning of represent, the possibility that
the Act would still impermissibly punish works of satire, fiction,
and parody seems markedly clear.
In addition, the Act would still apply to mistaken
remarks regarding receipt of military awards because the
definition Judge Bybee relies upon focuses on the point of view of
the listener, not the speaker. An individual prosecuted under the
Act need not even realize that he or she created a misimpression,
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Id. at 1240-41.
Represent Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
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but the statement he or she made still may have “br[ought] [that
misimpression] clearly before the mind” of the listener.184
Overall, the two limiting constructions offered by Judge
Bybee and Judge Jones do not appear to prevent the Act’s
application to mistaken or theatrical statements. Even though
it is difficult to determine whether these applications of the Act
are substantial enough, it appears that no reasonable limiting
construction would be able to refute a facial challenge of the
overbreadth of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Although no court
has so held, the Act is facially invalid under the First
Amendment because it is overbroad.
2. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
In general, when the Court applies the overbreadth
doctrine, it also analyzes the regulation in terms of void-forvagueness.185 Under this analysis, a law must “state explicitly
and definitely what acts are prohibited, so as to provide fair
warning and preclude arbitrary enforcement.”186 The Supreme
Court has asserted that the more important element of the two
is the principle regarding enforcement guidelines proffered by
the legislature.187 “Where the legislature fails to provide such
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit ‘a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections.’”188
In his overbreadth analysis of the Act, Judge Bybee
contended that the term represents guides law enforcement in
restricting the sweep of the statute.189 However, reliance upon law
enforcement’s interpretation of a word (especially a word that is
defined in a plethora of ways) does not completely prevent
arbitrary enforcement. Thus, in light of the way the Stolen Valor
Act of 2005 is written, there is nothing to stop its arbitrary
enforcement without “explicit[]” or “definite[]” guidelines.
184

Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1238 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Perhaps if this limiting
construction were combined with a requirement that the individual knowingly make
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Furthermore, the Act does not provide citizens “actual
notice” of what statements are truly punishable within the
ambiguities of the word represents.190 Because of this lack of
notice, the Act has the ability to “chill” speech in contravention
of First Amendment purposes. Only Judge Bybee, in his
dissent, has analyzed the Act under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. Despite this, it seems apparent that the Act is voidfor-vagueness and unconstitutional.
III.

CONGRESS’S IMPERFECT PROPOSAL—THE STOLEN VALOR
ACT OF 2011

Although the foregoing constitutional analyses provide a
basis to strike down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005,191 in an
attempt to fix the flaws in section 704(b), Congress proposed a
new statute entitled the Stolen Valor Act of 2011.192 While the
proposed bill provides a better means to police speech that
steals valor, Congress has not addressed all of the flaws the
courts have raised and may still be unable to receive a
constitutional consensus among the courts.
A.

The Stolen Valor Act of 2011 Would Still Regulate
Protected Speech

Even though Congress attempted to distinguish the
proposed bill from section 704(b) by criminalizing
“misrepresentations”
rather
than
“false
claims,”193
“misrepresentations” like “mere lies” or “false statements of
fact” would likely not be deemed to hold their own category of
unprotected speech under Stevens.194 The “misrepresentations”
in the proposed bill, however, do not completely stand alone;
the bill requires specific “intent to obtain anything of value.”195
While this added element may aid in avoiding First
Amendment scrutiny, intent alone would likely not be
sufficient without a requisite harm.
In his amicus curiae brief in United States v. Strandlof,
Eugene Volokh argued that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, if
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See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006).
See supra Part II.
See Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
Compare Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), with H.R. 1775.
See supra Part II.A.
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construed to require knowing false statements, is constitutional.
Professor Volokh asserted that
[p]eople who lie about decorations generally do so for a reason: They
may want to get elected to public office, or to get more credibility for
their own statements in another’s election campaign, or to get more
credibility in some nonelectoral political debate, or even just to get
more respect from neighbors, acquaintances, and potential business
associates. They are thus trying to manipulate people’s behavior
through falsehood, and their false claims are quite likely to indeed
affect others’ behavior (especially since having a military decoration
is often seen as an especially important mark of good character).196

Professor Volokh suggests that manipulating “private
citizens’ behavior through falsehoods is a significant enough
harm” on its own.197 Therefore, there is no need to eliminate an
express harm or injury requirement in the statute.198 While
Professor Volokh’s argument is consistent with the perceived
unsavory nature of these misrepresentations, in striking the
law down, the Ninth Circuit and the District Court of Colorado
both found it persuasive that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 does
not require harm to be proven.199
This contradiction may be due to Clay Calvert and
Rebekah Rich’s suggestion that, after Stevens, the courts have
shifted their constitutional analysis under the First
Amendment from a more “value-based methodology”—which
examines the societal value of the speech at issue and only
protects speech that matters—to a “causation-of-harm-based
methodology,” which focuses upon “the direct nexus (if any)
between that speech and the alleged harms to humans that it
causes.”200
This understanding of Stevens cuts against an argument
that the misrepresentations contemplated by the Act should be
given their own category of unprotected speech without a
requisite harm. Further, there is no historical evidence that
misrepresentations with specific intent but without requisite
harm have been unprotected by the First Amendment.201 The
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courts’ recent shift to a “causation-of-harm-based methodology”202
coupled with the reluctance of lower courts to carve out new
categories of unprotected speech203 suggest that courts will not find
that the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 regulates unprotected speech.
B.

The Proposed Bill Would Still Be a Content-Based
Restriction Subject to Strict Scrutiny

In addition to regulating protected speech, just as section
704(b) was a content-based restriction,204 the proposed legislation,
which regulates misrepresentations regarding one’s military
service, would also be a content-based restriction. Therefore, the
proposed bill would likely be subject to strict scrutiny.205
The government’s purported interest behind the Stolen
Valor Act of 2011 would likely go further than the Stolen Valor
Act of 2005. Potentially, the government could argue that the
proposed bill protects not just the reputation of the awards but
the reputation of the entire military. This expanded government
interest may be found compelling under a strict scrutiny
analysis, despite a lack of precedent. First, the interest does not
run afoul of Texas v. Johnson, which took issue with “preserving
the flag as a symbol of national unity,”206 because “symbols” such
as the military awards and decorations of section 704(b) are not
the only content regulated by the proposed legislation.
Additionally, because the government interest is a broader
military purpose, it may receive the deference that courts
generally give to military purposes in line with the congressional
authority to “raise and support armies.”207
Despite the seemingly compelling nature of this
government interest, preserving the reputation of the military,
a government entity, presents a conflict with a traditional First
Amendment policy of preventing statutes providing for
As
Geoffrey
Stone
“government . . . self-preservation.”208
202
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204
See supra Part II.B.1.
205
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
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contends, in striking down self-preserving laws, the Court not
only wishes to prevent legislators from using “the power of
government to intimidat[e] [and] silence its critics,” but the
Court also does not want the government “to dominate and
manipulate public debate.”209 The government may breach this
principle outwardly,210 or it may do so pretextually, that is, by
stating a permissible purpose while trying, in fact, to suppress
opposition.211 Either way, the Court has illustrated that such
regulations are unconstitutional.212
For example, in Schact v. United States, the Court
struck down a law that prohibited actors from wearing
accurate military uniforms in theatrical productions that
negatively portrayed the military.213 This law was not only an
attempt to censor critics of the Vietnam War, but was also an
attempt to dominate the public arena with only positive
associations between soldiers and the war.214
While the statute in Schact seemed to be enacted with
the express purpose to preserve the government, the Stolen
Valor Act of 2011 would not seem to have the same purpose.215
The proposed legislation is a response to inconsistent court
rulings regarding the Stolen Valor Act of 2005’s
constitutionality.216 Further, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was a
response to the increased crime perpetuated by the false
representations.217 Moreover, unlike the statute in Schact,218 the
misrepresentations of the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 do not depict
the military in a negative light.219 Thus, the bill does not aid in
“silencing [government] critics,” nor does it “manipulate public
209
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debate.”220 Even though the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 could be
perceived, as a matter of policy, as an impermissible regulation,
policing misrepresentations regarding one’s military service does
not seem to amount to actual government self-preservation.
Even if the Court deems the government’s interest
compelling, the bill would still be subject to a narrow tailoring
analysis under strict scrutiny. With the specific intent
requirement, the proposed legislation is a less restrictive
measure than the currently enacted section 704(b). However,
without requisite harm the legislation does not seem to provide
the “least restrictive means” to achieve the compelling
government interest at stake.
As already indicated, Calvert and Rich suggest that
harm caused by speech is now the central focus of First
Amendment analysis.221 Even though Volokh would likely
suggest that misrepresentations themselves produce a
significant enough harm to pass constitutional muster,222 under
a strict scrutiny analysis it is unlikely that a court invoking the
“causation-of-harm-based methodology” would uphold the
proposed legislation without a more express harm indicated in
the statute.223 Therefore, the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 would
likely be held unconstitutional under strict scrutiny and would
not completely resolve the conflicts between the Stolen Valor
Act of 2005 and the First Amendment.
C.

The Stolen Valor Act of 2011 Would Not Be Overbroad or
Void-for-Vagueness

In the event that the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 is deemed
a regulation of unprotected speech, the Act would be subject to
the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines instead of
strict scrutiny.224 Under these two analyses, however, the Court
would likely hold the proposed legislation constitutional, unlike
the currently enacted section 704(b).
The proposed legislation not only requires that the
misrepresentations be made knowingly but also that the
misrepresentations be made with the specific intent to obtain
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anything of value.225 In interpreting the Stolen Valor Act of
2011, a limiting construction would not be necessary because
the specific intent already restricts the reach of the proposed
legislation to reduce its scope. The proposed act does not
regulate speech in a manner that is overbroad like the Stolen
Valor Act of 2005.226 Thus, the proposed legislation would not be
unconstitutionally overbroad.
Similarly, with the addition of the specific intent
requirement, more specific guidelines would be in place to
prevent law enforcement from “pursu[ing] their personal
predilections” and arbitrarily enforcing the criminal statute.227
Therefore, the proposed legislation would pass constitutional
muster under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
IV.

SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT
SPEECH THAT STEALS VALOR

In proposing the new legislation, Congress recognized the
value in policing speech that steals valor and the need for
reconstructing the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 to avoid running
afoul of the First Amendment.228 However, Congress’s proposed
legislation does not appear to sufficiently amend the Act to pass
constitutional muster. This note suggests two measures that will
better police speech that steals valor. First, Congress should
redraft the proposed legislation to resemble a fraud statute.
Second, state and local legislatures should impose an eligibility
requirement for individuals seeking to run for public office.
A.

Fraudulent Misrepresentations of Military Content—A
Better Resolution

To transform the Stolen Valor Act of 2011 into a fraud
statute, Congress would need to add a harm element to the
statute.229 Calvert and Rich suggest that Congress should draft a
fraud statute that includes a “monetary harm” requirement.230 But
the statute may be more effective if it were to include a less specific
form of harm (such as obtaining a benefit that the perpetrator is
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not entitled to).231 While a monetary harm may provide stricter
guidelines for law enforcement to follow, as Volokh points out,
these military lies are made for a variety of purposes, not just for
money.232 Additionally, Congress should eliminate the specific
intent it has imposed in the 2011 Act and only cover knowing
misrepresentations.233 The fraud statute would also be able to
invoke the Stolen Valor Act of 2011’s broader application to not just
false representations about receiving military awards, but also
misrepresentations about one’s military service.234
By restructuring the statute to resemble fraud, Congress
would be able to regulate unprotected speech and would only be
subject to the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines, not
strict scrutiny.235 Requiring knowledge and harm would aid in
satisfying these doctrines because the statute would not punish
inadvertent or mistaken misrepresentations—or satirical or
imaginative expression.236 The special fraud statute would also
avoid granting law enforcement too much discretion, which
would lead to arbitrary enforcement.237
There are a few conceivable objections to creating a
special fraud statute, but they do not appear to be compelling.
First, some may argue that criminal sanctions are ineffective or
too harsh.238 As already indicated, in Texas v. Johnson, the
Supreme Court asserted that “[i]f there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to overt the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”239 However, “more speech” is
evidently an insufficient deterrent due to the increased
incidence relating to these misrepresentations.240
Second, implementing a special fraud statute may be
moot because there are already general fraud statutes in
231

See, e.g., United States v. Harmon, 496 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir. 1974)
(dismissing an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1970) because it did not allege that
defendant performed any acts).
232
See Volokh, supra note 196, at 353-54.
233
See Part II.A.1 (describing fraud as requiring knowledge and a bona fide harm).
234
Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
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See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582, 1592 (2010); Vill.
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-504 (1982);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-22 (1972).
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See supra Part II.C.1 (analyzing the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 under the
overbreadth doctrine).
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See supra Part II.C.2.
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Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (citing Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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Davenport, supra note 17.
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place.241 A separate and distinct fraud statute addressing
misrepresentations of military content would, however, ensure
that the problems arising from such statements would without
question be addressed.242 Moreover, Congress can impose an
enhanced punishment for committing this specialized
fraudulent act. In turn, prosecutors can not only charge a
separate count on an indictment (and perhaps an extra
conviction), but also incur greater deterrence. Furthermore, a
fraud statute would be more effective than relying upon
existing impersonation statutes. That is, fraud does not require
the same requisite degree of conduct in furtherance of the
misrepresentations.243
Third, as a matter of policy, some may argue that this
specialized fraud statute is inconsistent with First Amendment
principles. The Supreme Court has specifically tried to reveal
and quash government interference with speech that attempts
government self-preservation, government suppression of the
democratic “marketplace of ideas,” and government repression
of speech in times of crisis.244 In terms of government selfpreservation, the Court is mainly concerned with legislators
using “the . . . power of government to intimidat[e] [and] silence
its critics.”245 Here, the purpose behind the specialized fraud
statute is concededly to protect the reputation of the military, a
government entity. However, the misrepresentations at issue
do not portray or criticize the military in a negative light but
rather serve as a tool to use military stature to one’s benefit.246
As for suppression of the “marketplace of ideas,” the Court
seeks to uphold the people’s democratic self-governance by
maintaining a free and open public forum for speech.247 When
the government seeks to restrict speech that “convey[s] a
political message, . . . a matter of public concern, or . . . a view
point or opinion” regardless of any political underpinnings, the
241

See supra Part II.A.1. The implementation of a fraud statute in this context
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Court seeks to protect it.248 While misrepresentations about
one’s military service could conceivably be considered a “matter
of public concern,” a special fraud statute would not chill or
discourage speech because of the statutory limitations upon the
punishable speech. Perhaps the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 chills
speech because it reaches a broader range of lies including
mistaken or satirical false statements,249 but the special fraud
statute would not. An additional type of regulation the Court
generally tries to prevent as a matter of policy arises “in times of
crisis, real or imagined, [because] citizens and government
officials tend to panic, to grow desperately intolerant, and to rush
headlong to suppress speech they can demonize as dangerous,
subversive, disloyal, or unpatriotic.”250 This type of government
regulation was present, for example, during World War I, when
states attempted to promote national unity in response to
xenophobic panic.251 While the special fraud statute would be
enacted partly in response to the increased amount of incidence
relating to false statements of military commendation,252 the
statute would not be the type of poorly thought-out and excessive
regulation the Court has sought to strike down.253 State and
federal legislatures respond to increases in crime rates all the
time. Thus, increased crime rates do not always constitute the
type of crisis regulations the Supreme Court seeks to prevent.254
Therefore, restructuring the proposed legislation to
resemble a fraud statute is a less restrictive and a more likely
constitutional alternative to the existing Act. Further, a fraud
statute would still be an effective means of meeting the
government interests at stake.
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Holding Public Officials Accountable

In addition to drafting a specific fraud statute, this note
calls upon state and local legislatures to enhance eligibility
requirements for individuals seeking to serve as elected
officials. Public officials, such as Blumenthal and Kirk, have
used their military status to further their political goals even
when that status, in reality, is not what they made it out to
be.255 Despite the exposure of their lies, these individuals are
still being elected into office,256 which seems unsavory. After all,
these individuals are seeking a position of power in a
government while at the same time diminishing the honor of
the military that serves to protect it.
The Constitution currently sets forth the minimum
requirements to run for an elected position in the federal
government.257 The Constitution requires of candidates a
minimum age, a minimum time of citizenship, and legal
residence within the area for which the candidate seeks to
serve.258 In addition to these bare essentials, each state has
general eligibility requirements for federal, state, and local level
positions.259 For example, some states require that a candidate
not be a convicted felon.260 In light of the recent political
scandals, this note suggests that state and local legislatures
should impose an additional eligibility requirement that
individuals not misrepresent their military service. For example,
the eligibility requirement could provide the following:
No person shall qualify as a candidate for elective public office or
maintain a public office if already elected in the state of XX who has
knowingly made misrepresentations regarding his or her military
service during the course of any campaign for nomination or election
to public office, by means of campaign materials, including an
advertisement on radio, television, or the Internet, or in a newspaper
or periodical, a public speech, or press release, with the intent to
promote the election of that person.
255
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This eligibility requirement is similar to a criminal
statute upheld by the Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Davis:
(B) No person, during the course of any campaign for nomination or
election to public office or office of a political party, by means of
campaign materials, including sample ballots, an advertisement on
radio or television or in a newspaper or periodical, a public speech,
press release, or otherwise, shall purposely do any of the following:
....
(10) post, publish, circulate, or distribute a written or
printed false statement, either knowing the same to be false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,
concerning a candidate that is designed to promote the
election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.261

In Davis, the court examined this criminal sanction
under strict scrutiny and found that the state had a compelling
interest “to promote honesty in the election of public officers.”262
According to the court, “[f]reedom of speech does not include a
right to purposely, with knowledge of its falsity, publish a false
statement about a candidate for public office with the intent to
promote the election or defeat of such candidate.”263 The court
also found the criminal statute narrowly tailored because it
“expressly limits a conviction to cases where there is proof that
the statements were known to be false or were made in
reckless disregard of their falsity.”264
Despite this supportive precedent, holding public
officials accountable for these misstatements, concededly,
would be difficult. Other cases do not uphold a state’s interest
in criminalizing false political campaign speech. In fact, one
court found that “[t]he constitutional guarantee of free speech
has its ‘fullest and most urgent application in political
campaigns.’”265 For example, in Brown v. Hartlage, the Supreme
Court struck down a criminal statute that sanctioned an
elected official’s unfulfilled and false campaign promises.266
Even though the Court found that the State had legitimate
interests in ensuring “that its governing political institutions
261
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and officials properly discharge public responsibilities and
maintain public trust . . . [and] in upholding the integrity of the
electoral process itself,” the Court did not find the interest to be
compelling.267 Additionally, in Washington ex. rel. Public
Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No! Committee, the
Washington Supreme Court analyzed a criminal statute that
sanctioned political candidates who “sponsor[ed] with actual
malice . . . [p]olitical advertising that contain[ed] a false
statement of material fact.”268 This statute was similar to the
statute at issue in Garrison v. Louisiana, which penalized
statements criticizing a public official’s conduct when made with
actual malice.269 In both cases the statutes were struck down.270 In
Vote No!, the court vigorously argued against the criminalization
of false campaign speech, asserting that “[i]n political campaigns
the grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are
immune from legal sanction unless they violate private rights—
that is, unless individuals are defamed.”271 In addition to adverse
precedent, Congress has exempted false political campaign
advertisements from the Federal Trade Commission sanctions
upon other types of false advertising.272 Moreover, numerous
scholars suggest that sanctioning false campaign speech would be
an ineffective method because it would fuel voter alienation;
afford yet another avenue for one candidate to attack her
opponent; and lead to extensive litigation, civil or criminal, that
would continue long after the election is over.273
267

Id. at 52.
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However, the courts, Congress, and scholars have
generally addressed false campaign speech that one candidate
or political organization puts forth about the opponent.274 Here,
the suggested eligibility requirement targets false statements
about the individual’s own résumé. In this situation, public
officials are certainly able to bear this burden. Further,
targeting this type of speech does not raise the same concerns
of voter alienation and extensive litigation among opponents.
The eligibility requirement would also circumvent the
constitutional problems implicated by criminally sanctioning
campaign speech because the “integrity of the electoral process”
would be preserved in a less restrictive manner.275
In addition to a lack of criminalization, the eligibility
requirement is further distinguishable from all of the statutes at
issue in Brown, Garrison and Vote No!. In Brown, the statute
sanctions speech that operates prospectively, whereas the
misrepresentations in the eligibility requirement would target
speech about one’s past.276 In Garrison, the statute targeted
statements made with actual malice, without regard to whether
those false statements were made knowingly or were in fact false.277
Thus, the statute criminalized truthful statements as well as
inadvertent or mistaken false statements.278 In Vote No!, the statute
sanctioned false statements made with actual malice.279 While the
statute did not criminalize truthful statements, it still had the
ability to sanction inadvertent or mistaken false statements.280
Thus, the imposition of this eligibility requirement,
which expressly prohibits individuals from obtaining or
maintaining a government position if they misrepresent their
military history, would likely provide a permissible and
effective source of accountability.
Interestingly, if the eligibility requirement and the
specialized fraud statute were enacted together, the eligibility
requirement would enhance the effectiveness of the fraud statute.
Prosecutors could not charge political candidates under the
Negative Campaign Commercials, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 89 (1999); William P. Marshall,
False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 297 (2004).
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specific fraud statute due to the difficulty in establishing
individualized detrimental reliance amongst voters. But the
eligibility requirement would aid in expanding the reach of the
fraud statute by holding politicians, such as Blumenthal or Kirk,
accountable for their misrepresentations. Additionally, if public
officials are held accountable for their misrepresentations, the
publicity such political scandals receive will aid in enhancing the
deterrence of the same behavior in private citizens by illustrating
the ramifications of this behavior and exemplifying equality of
treatment amongst the rulers and the people.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment because it is a content-based
restriction on speech that fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. Under
First Amendment principles, however, the type of speech the
Stolen Valor Act seeks to prevent is not the type of speech the
framers sought to protect. Due to the history of protecting
military valor in the United States and the increased number of
false representations of military service, legislators must take
another path to deter this type of behavior. While Congress has
begun an attempt at revising the Act, the proposed legislation is
still unlikely to pass constitutional muster. Thus, Congress
should instead restructure the Act to resemble a fraud statute. In
addition, state and local governments should hold public officials
accountable for such misrepresentations. An effective method of
doing so would be to impose an eligibility requirement that
prohibits, for individuals seeking an elected position, false claims
of military valor and service. Overall, false claims of military
valor are worth policing in some way. Legislatures should
revitalize their original initiative behind the Stolen Valor Act of
2005 and invoke the aforementioned constitutional alternatives.
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